Strategic outlook for Australia
Defense must have an evidence-basis, just like all other policies. Allowing alarming 'long-tail' scenarios, such as an aggressive Chinese military posture, to drive policy—if that is what the Defense planners have in mind—is like gambling, not strategic planning. We don't have the resources to 'over-insure against a remote…risk', any more than Robert Gates does.
Our defense outlook is benign by historical standards. Buried in The Australian's recent account of bureaucratic struggles over the forthcoming White Paper on defense, is a brief mention of a key assessment that seems accurate to me:
"ONA and DIO agree that Australia's strategic environment out to 2030 will be dominated by two broad challenges. The first is failed and failing states in Australia's areas of primary strategic interest, including East Timor in the Indonesian archipelago and others stretching across the southwest Pacific to Vanuatu and Fiji. A second is the likelihood of conflicts further afield, including transnational insurgencies such as Afghanistan, which could see the deployment of Australian forces in coalition with US or UN force" Extract from The Australian
This Easter weekend has seen two contrasting events that seem to confirm that this assessment captures both the locus and scale of the real strategic threats facing Australia.
First, the deepening of the normal democratic process in Indonesia—completing only it's fourth democratic election since WWII (1955, 1999, 2004 and 2009)—is excellent strategic news for Australia, despite the continuing policy turmoil that minority government seems to guarantee. But, second, the events in Fiji this weekend are a reminder that political and social unrest in several of our closest neighbors could destroy their prosperity, undermining ours.
Solomons, which is heading for economic ruin, and possibly PNG—by far the largest of the Pacific states—belong on the list mentioned in The Australian article. Vanuatu? Not so much.
Posted on 04/13 at 10:40 AM.
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